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Abstract
The Maryland Declaration of Rights proclaims "That every
freeman, for any injury done to him in his person, or property, ought to
have remedy by the course of the Law of the Land, and ought to have
justice and right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and
speedily without delay, according to the Law of the Land." America's
litigation lawyers know that these fine words do not describe the reality
of our system of civil justice. Last year the American College of Trial
Lawyers pronounced our system a "captive to cost, delay and
gamesmanship" and "in serious need of repair." The Iqbal decision is an
attempt to deal with one of many failings of our system.
Globalization challenges America to construct a system of civil
justice that works. Foreign parties find litigating here a "nightmare."
So, too, do our own people, but they do not know alternatives. The
Report of the American College of Trial Lawyers reminds us that our
foreign friends know alternatives that work well; no wonder that they are
disappointed here.
This article is based on a forthcoming book that examines from
beginning to end, a lawsuit in three countries: the United States,
Germany and Korea. The book shows ways that one foreign legal
system minimizes costs and delay and promotes decisions according to
justice and right. The draft chapters of the book are available online at
http://ssrn.com/author-825054.
This article puts pleading in historical and comparative
perspectives. It shows how past and present systems of American
pleading have failed while the German system succeeds.
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INTRODUCTION

This article is based on a book that is nearing publication. The book
is over two hundred pages. It is a comparative introduction to three
systems of civil justice-American, German and Korean-presented
through a biography of the same lawsuit in three systems.
In this article, I focus on aspects related to the Iqbal case. I have
four points:
* The Iqbal decision confirms the breakdown of
contemporary American civil procedure. We know what
civil procedure should do, and we know that our civil
procedure is not doing it. Civil procedure should facilitate
determining rights according to law. It should help courts
and parties apply law to facts accurately, fairly,
expeditiously and efficiently. This article reflects on three
historic American system failures and reports a foreign
success story.
* Pleadings can help courts do what we know courts should
decide a case on the merits, accurately, fairly,
do:
expeditiously and efficiently. Pleadings facilitate a day in
court when focused on deciding according to law. Pleadings
are, however, only part of the process of determining rights
and of applying law to facts. They cannot do it all. Their
utility is limited by the interdependent nature of determining
law and finding facts to apply law to facts.
* The United States has had three principal systems of civil
procedure;' all three have failed. The United States has used
three principal forms of pleading-common law pleading,
fact pleading, and notice pleading; all three have proven
None has achieved both accuracy and
inadequate.
expedition; none has managed both fairness and efficiency.
1. In order to keep this article within bounds, I do not address equity procedure,
which complemented legal procedure and which I am considering as part of the common
law system. Equity procedure contributed substantially to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987);
Amalia D. Kessler, Our InquisitorialTradition: Equity Procedure,Due Process, and the
Searchfor an Alternative to the Adversarial,90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005). I justify
this simplification on the ground that equity was intended, in most matters, to
complement common law procedure to deal with the exceptional rather than the routine,
and that it too did not work well. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, JR., A STATEMENT OF FACTS
IN RELATION TO THE DELAYS AND ARREARS OF BUSINESS IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR A CHANGE INITS ORGANIZATION
(1838); CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1852).
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Although wildly different in what they have required of
pleading, all three systems of civil procedure have shared
common flaws: they have expected too much of lawyers and
not enough of judges. They have allowed issue deciding to
substitute for law applying.
* Since 1877 Germany has had only one system of civil
procedure; that system has worked well. It has stood the test
of time. Its unchallenged and unchanged basic principle is
that parties provide facts and courts apply law. Da mihi
factum, dabo tibijus. Parties and courts cooperate. Pleading
is only the beginning of that cooperation. Pleading leads
directly to a day in court. Pleading directs the court down
the path to a decision according to law.
One caveat: pleading is only a part of civil procedure. Indeed, that
is part of my thesis. This symposium is about the Iqbal decision and
about pleading. Here, I largely limit myself to pleading. Space does not
allow me to consider other aspects of civil justice systems. In my book, I
have attempted to deal with systems as wholes.
II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE'S CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS

The essential purpose of civil procedure is the determination of
rights and duties among private parties according to law. Determining
the rights and duties of parties resolves their disputes. If there were no
civil procedure, private parties might use self-help to realize rights and to
resolve disputes. The stronger, rather than the righteous, would prevail.2
The basic requirements of civil procedure are well known: accurate
determinations of right, reached through fair process, without delay, and
freely available to everyone, i.e. accurate, fair, expeditious, and
efficient. 3 We state these expectations in our state constitutions in what
we call "open courts" clauses. Our Founding Fathers declared them in
state declarations of rights that they made coincident with our
2. See, e.g., 3 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*2 (1768; 1st Am. ed., Philadelphia, 1772) ("The more effectually to accomplish the
redress of private injuries, courts of justice are instituted in every civilized society, in
order to protect the weak from the insults of the stronger, by expounding and enforcing
those laws, by which rights are defined, and wrongs prohibited.").
3. Cf. John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil ProcedureReform, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN
CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 53, 54-55 (A.A.S. Zuckerman,
Sergio Chiarloni & Peter Gottwald eds. 1999) (after discussing fairness and asserting
radical disagreement among systems about goals, then states: "[b]ypassing for the
moment the debate about goals, we might fix on three fairly trite-criteria for appraising a
procedural system: the cost of litigation, the time needed to resolve disputes, and the
accuracy with which the system finds the facts and applies the law.").
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Declaration of Independence. The Maryland Declaration of Rights of
1776, which with only the slightest change is part of the Maryland
Constitution today, proclaims: "That every freeman, for any injury done
to him in his person, or property, ought to have remedy by the course of
the Law of the Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without
sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to
the Law of the Land."4 The Pennsylvania Constitution is similar.s
"The civil justice system is ...

A.

in serious need of repair'"6

The Iqbal decision is a modest-if ineffectual-attempt to fix a
system that is, according to a report of the American College of Trial
Lawyers, "in serious need of repair."7 Here, I won't try to convince you
of that. If you are a lawyer, you already know it. If you are client,
chances are, you have already experienced it. If you are a student, and
you have done a litigation internship, you have at least sensed it. If you
are a student and have not done a litigation internship, you may still
believe the law school myth that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of
1938 fixed everything.8
They did not. Make no mistake about it: no competent lawyer
would claim that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attain their stated
goal of "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding." 9 It is doubtful that they do that in the majority of cases.
They certainly do not do that if one takes into account all the cases that
are not brought because the rules are unsatisfactory. Criticisms are
legion and come from both the right and from the left, and from both
lawyers in the trenches all the way up to Chief Justices of the United
States.10

4.

Art. 17, Maryland DeclarationofRights ofNov. 3, 1776, in THE DECISIVE BLOW

IS STRUCK, A FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION
OF 1776 AND THE FIRST MARYLAND CONSTITUTION (1977). The only material difference
in the current constitution acknowledges the end of slavery: "man" substitutes for
"freeman."
5. PA. CONST. art. 1 § 11 ("All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of
law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.").
6. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT
OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009) [hereinafter
"ACTL REPORT"].

7.
8.

Id.
Leubsdorf, supra note 3, at 53.

9.

FED. R. Civ. P. 1. A German lawyer might reasonably say this if "every" were

qualified by "almost." See text at note 101 infra.
10. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Speech to the American Bar Association (February
12, 1984), reprinted at Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary,The State of Justice,
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American civil procedure does not routinely determine rights
accurately, through fair process, and without delay. It is not efficient: its
costs are not proportionate to matters in controversy. Civil justice is not
available to all. Only exceptionally are lawsuits decided on their merits.
Only infrequently do they settle without major consideration being given
to process costs."
The Iqbal decision is a response to that breakdown. It is an attempt
to fix a broken system. Those who criticize the Iqbal decision should
bear in mind the Court's goal of system reform. Critics should not just
call for return to some idyllic past where things worked for a class of
cases of interest to them. They should offer ideas that contribute to
fixing the system, not for some cases, but for all.
B.

Taking Advantage of What has been Done by the Civil Law1 2

My purpose is to bring into consideration foreign ideas that can
contribute to fixing the system for all cases. I am encouraged that
colleagues at that other Pennsylvania law school, earlier in this very year,
called upon American scholars to do just that."
With that
encouragement, and with knowledge that Penn State, thanks to its former
Dean and my long time friend and supporter, Louis Del Duca, is in the
forefront of international legal studies, I am confident that I do not need
to convince this symposium of the benefits of comparative law.
Just in case, however, a few of you, although committed to
international legal studies, are skeptical whether comparative study has
something to offer in the field of civil procedure, let me reassure you that
there is nothing suspect about measuring our procedure against
procedure elsewhere in the world. The authors of our systems of
70 A.B.A.J. 62, 66 (April 1984) ("Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive,
too inefficient for a truly civilized people."); Earl Warren, Foreword, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COURT CONGESTION, TEN CURES FOR COURT
CONGESTION 7 (1959) ("Interminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts are today
compromising the basic legal rights of countless thousands of Americans and,
imperceptibly, corroding the very foundations of constitutional government in the United
States.")
11. Some scholars assert that forcing settlements-no matter what the grounds-are
beneficial.
12. The French jurist, Pierre LePaulle, who after expressing "his amazement at the
ineffective manner in which justice is administered ... more like a high church ceremony
than a business transaction," asked "Why don't you take advantage of what has been
done by the civil law, that governs at least twice as many people as the common law, is
two thousand years older, and embodies a much greater amount of human experience?"
Quoted in Edson R. Sunderland, Book Review, 15 A.B.A.J. 35 (1929).
13. Catherine T. Struve, Foreword, Procedure as Palimpsest, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
421, 433-34 (2010); Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards,
158 U. PA. L. REv. 441, passim (2010).
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procedure and of pleading took account of foreign law. Supreme Court
Justice Joseph Story, who wrote the first American text on pleading,14
and who did more than any other person to make an American law," told
the bar: "There is no country on earth which has more to gain than ours
Let us not vainly
by the thorough study of foreign jurisprudence ....
all
the
stores of juridical
imagine that we have unlocked and exhausted
6
wisdom and policy."' David Dudley Field, author of the Field Code,
asked: "Why might we not have comparative law, to place the legal
systems of different countries and ages side by side, that the lawyer may
profit by the history of the world? He is, perhaps, the only man of
science who does not look beyond his own commonwealth, and to whom
the history of other countries is as a sealed book."' 7
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 and of
its pleading provisions were aware of foreign counterparts. Judge
Charles E. Clark, principal draftsman, wrote admiringly of European
pleading practices: "We tend towards the civil law system; we shall
probably not reach it for many generations, if at all."' Professor Edson
R. Sunderland, mastermind of the pretrial provisions including pleading,
reminded us that "[1]itigation is merely a means to an end, like
transportation, and the same tests should apply to both. No American
objects to the use of the Diesel engine because it is of German origin
....

In every field of human activity outside of the law men are

constantly searching for new and better methods, overcoming the barriers
of language and forgetting the prejudices of nationality and race." 9
This article addresses pleading in only one foreign legal aystem,
that of Germany. I have chosen Germany because the German system of
civil procedure is among the most influential of all systems of civil
14. JOSEPH STORY, A SELECTION OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL ACTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO
THE DECLARATION (1805).
15. See ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA IN AMERICAN LAW 140-143 (1938).
16. Joseph Story, Progress of Jurisprudence,Address at the Suffolk Bar on their
Anniversary (September 4, 1821), reprintedin THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH
STORY 198, 235 (1852). See also James Kent, An Introductory Lecture to a Course of
Law Lectures 15 (1794) reprinted in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE
FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, at 936, 945 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983).
17. David Dudley Field, Study and Practice of Law, 14 U.S. MAG & DEM.
REV.(1844), reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF
DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 491 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884). Both Field and Story were in touch
with C.F.A. Mittermaier, a European leader in the study of foreign law of the day. Story
wrote an article on American law for Mittermaier's journal on foreign law. See Felix
Frankfurter, Forward,3 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1954). I own a set of law reform tracts from
the 1840s that Field presented to Mittermaier.
18. Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV.
517, 543 (1925).
19. Edson R. Sunderland, CurrentLegal Literature,15 A.B.A. J. 35 (1929).
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procedure in the world. 20 It is influential, because it works. 2 1 It works for
a country similar to ours in values and economy. Germany is the most
populous and most important Member State of the 27-Member European
Union.
C.

What ofAmerican Exceptionalism? 22

What of American "exceptionalism" in civil justice? Are our goals
so similar? Placed in the best light, American exceptionalism means,
with respect to procedure, that American civil procedure attempts things
that other systems do not, e.g., it makes new law or it promotes social
23
action.
Other contributions to this symposium address how the Iqbal
decision may undercut those goals of civil procedure.
The goals of American exceptionalism are laudable. Whether civil
litigation is the optimal way to achieve those goals is beyond the bounds
of this article.24 That there are limits to systemic reform through
litigation is well-recognized.2 5
In any case, we need not address that point here. Even the most
enthusiastic adherents of American exceptionalism and of instrumental
uses of procedure, however, ought to acknowledge that we should expect
American civil procedure, while attempting the exceptional, to
accomplish the mundane.
Think of civil procedure as a multifunction machine such as you are
accustomed to use with computers. Would you buy a combination
scanner/printer to do both functions, if it did only one passably well?
No. You expect a multi-function device to do multiple functions well.
20. See generally, DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZEBRECHT UND SEINE AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF
ANDERE RECHTSORDNUNGEN (Walther J. Habscheid, ed. 1991).

21. See text at note 101 infra.
22. On "American Exceptionalism in Federal Civil Pleading," see Dodson, supra
note 13, at 447-55.
23. In its worst light: our peculiar institution.
24. Some American jurists see litigation as a route to law reform better than
legislation. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Litigation Explosion, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 189 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds.,
2008). Commonly they point to the famous decision in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (disapproving segregation) as an example of law reform
through cases. Yet even that triumph of litigation depended on legislation for realization,
e.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State
and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50
ALA. L. REv. 397, 440 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Joel Stashenko, Cost of Suit to Improve Defense of the Indigent Raises
Concerns, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 24, 2010, at 1 (reports on review of a motion to dismiss).
Judge Robert S. Smith of the New York Court of Appeals questioned the plaintiff's
attorney: "Isn't that a problem with systemic failure questions? What you're really
doing ... by upholding the complaint, you've signed a blank check that someone is going
to have to fill in later?"
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So, too, should our civil procedure. It should decide mundane cases as
well as exceptional ones. It should meet or beat minimum standards for
civil procedure generally. We turn to those standards shortly.
III. PLEADING AND ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE
In the course of administering justice between litigating parties, there
are two successive objects,-to ascertain the subject for decision, and
to decide.
Stephen on Pleading (1824-1921)26

Civil procedure is a process for applying law to facts to resolve
disputes. Its goal is facilitating decisions according to law. It is the
practical implementation of legal reasoning. Pleadings commence that
process. Proceedings continue it. Judgments conclude it. 27
We expect more of civil procedure than accurate outcomes. We
have expectations of the process itself. We expect that process will be
fair, expeditious and efficient. While we have not previously discussed it
in this article, we also expect that an authorized body will reach those
decisions. Pleading can contribute to fulfilling these needs of civil
procedure.

26. This is the first sentence of the leading work in nineteenth century America on
civil procedure, HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIvIL
AcnoNs; COMPRISING A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS IN A SUIT AT LAW 1

(Philadelphia, Abraham Small, 1824). The first American edition appeared in the year of
the first edition in London, 1824. Before the Civil War, there were six subsequent
editions by Francis J. Troubat. After the Civil War there were many more editions by
different editors, among them one by that icon of the common law, Samuel Williston, in
1895. Other editions included those by Franklin Fiske Heard (1867), Samuel Tyler
(multiple editions from 1871 to 1919), and James DeWitt Andrews (multiple editions
1894-1901). It was epitomized in other books.
Only seven years after the last edition of STEPHEN ON PLEADING appeared in 1921,
Judge Charles E. Clark, later principal draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
of 1938, published the first edition of his own treatise, Clark ON CODE PLEADING. It
begins similarly: "Before any dispute can be adjusted or decided it is necessary to
ascertain the actual points at issue between the disputants." CHARLES C. CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF CODE PLEADING 2 (2nd ed. 1947) (1st ed. 1928). When pleading and
practice, as topics of study, were merged into civil procedure, the emphasis was lost, but
the goal was not forgotten. Fleming James in the first paragraph of his first chapter on
pleading in his 1965 text, Civil Procedurereminds us of it. In its current 2001 edition it
reads: "The issues of fact and of law must be framed clearly enough so that the tribunal
knows what to decide." FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN
LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 180 (5th ed. 2001).
27. For a discussion in English of German judgments, see James R. Maxeiner,
ImaginingJudges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It, 114 PENN STATE L. REV. 469
(2009).
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The Purposes ofPleadingand the Needs of Civil Procedure

Historically, American pleadings have served three principal
purposes: (1) establishing jurisdiction of the court to consider the
controversy; (2) directing proceedings to material issues that the parties
dispute; and (3) bounding the controversy.28
A successful system of civil procedure requires that the system
accomplish all three of these purposes. It does not require, however, that
these purposes be accomplished exclusively, or even partly, by pleading.
The American system of common law pleading is an example of a
system where pleading was intended to accomplish all three purposes.
The contemporary system of notice pleading, on the other hand,
principally uses pleading to establish jurisdiction; it makes little use of
pleadings to direct or bound proceedings. The proposal of the American
College of Trial Lawyers to return to fact pleading would restore
directing and bounding to pleading.29
In this article we leave
establishing jurisdiction to one side.
Directing proceedings to material issues in dispute was the raison
d'etre of common law pleading. Common law pleading did not merely
direct proceedings to material issues in dispute: through pleading the
lawyers defined a single issue to determine the dispute between their
clients. Stephen on Pleading,the most popular text on civil procedure in
America throughout the nineteenth century, stated pleading's role
clearly: "In the course of administering justice between litigating parties,
there are two successive objects,-to ascertain the subject for decision,
and to decide.,,30 At one and the same time, the court decided an issue
and applied the law. Of course, the parties' lawyers, by defining the
issue, had already done most of the work in applying law to fact.
Deciding what to decide is essential to accurate decisions according
to law; deciding what not to consider, i.e., bounding the controversy, is
essential to fair, expeditious and efficient decisions. Going off point not
only delays final decisions of right, it makes those decisions more costly.
Setting bounds to the controversy conserves party resources. Setting
28. Cf Fleming James, Jr., The Objective and Function of the Complaint: Common
Law-Codes-FederalRules, 14 VAND. L. REV. 899 (1961); FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 2.2 (1965).
29. ACTL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5 ("The Purpose ofPleadings:Pleadingsshould
notify the opposing party and the court of the factual and legal basis of the pleader's
claims or defenses in order to define the issues offact and law to be adjudicated. They
should give the opposingparty and the court sufficient information to determine whether
the claim or defense is sufficient in law to merit continued litigation. Pleadingsshould
set practicallimits on the scope of discovery and trialand shouldgive the court sufficient
information to control and supervise the progress of the case to trial or other
resolution.") (emphasis in original).
30. STEPHEN, supra note 26.
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bounds to the controversy protects parties from surprise. Parties need to
prepare their cases only on matters before the court.
Bounding the controversy has an importance that transcends process
efficiency: protection of the autonomy of parties and the privacy of the
public. In all three of our systems of civil justice, while courts are
required to decide all private disputes properly brought to them, they are
prohibited from investigating on their own initiative matters not brought
to them by the parties. The court cannot properly examine or decide
those matters not before the court.
B.

What Law Applying Requires of Civil Procedure

Applying law to facts to decide cases on their merits requires
determining applicable rules, finding facts, and applying rules to facts.
This is considerably more difficult than is generally supposed. The legal
rule cannot always be read from a single statute or precedent. It often is
necessary to search statutes and precedents, analyze them, compare them
to facts, revisit statutes and precedents in light of the facts, and again
examine facts in light of the law. The end result is to bring facts and law
together.
Substantive law, as distinguished from procedural law, determines
rights and duties abstractly. Civil procedure translates those abstract
statements of rights and duties into determinations of rights and duties in
individual cases. Its method is legal reasoning. Some form of legal
reasoning is universal among modem legal systems.
31. Accord FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, A NEW INTRODUCTION
To LEGAL REASONING 1 (2009). See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A
LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1996); KARL ENGISCH, EINFOHRUNG

Dean Vandevelde provides a concise
definition of legal reasoning in the United States:
1. identify the applicable sources of law, usually statutes and judicial
decisions;
2. analyze these sources of law to determine the applicable rules of law and the
policies underlying those rules;
3. synthesize the applicable rules of law into a coherent structure in which the
more specific rules are grouped under the more general ones;
4. research the available facts; and
5. apply the structure of the rules to the facts to ascertain the rights or duties
created by the facts, using the policies underlying the rules to resolve
difficult cases.
IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN (9th ed. 1997).

KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE,

THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL

REASONING 2 (1996). Dean Vandevelde's formulation is not the only one found in the
United States. Other formulations emphasize legal argument more and law application
less. See, e.g., WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT (2002). But Dean

Vandevelde's formulation is within the American mainstream. For an English translation
of a leading German text, see REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, INTRODUCTION To GERMAN LEGAL
METHODS (2008).
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Legal reasoning relies on syllogisms for application of law.32 The
classic syllogism consists of a major premise, a minor premise and a
conclusion. A famous example is: "All men are mortal; Socrates is a
man; therefore, Socrates is mortal."
Typically a legal rule consists of more than one element. Each
element may itself require application of other rules to determine if the
prerequisite is satisfied. Only if all elements are present in a particular
case, does the rule apply. American procedure generally has the parties
decide which rules apply and to define which elements are in dispute; it
has courts only resolve those issues the parties present to them.
The process of rule application thus requires finding substantive law
governing the case (law-finding), finding facts that fulfill a governing
substantive rule (fact-finding), and applying the rule to the case to
produce the consequence mandated by it (law-applying). Thus rule
application brings facts and law together to produce a legal consequence
(often a right or duty). It presupposes that someone has already made the
laws to be applied (lawmaking).
C

The Limits ofPleading-TheInterdependency ofLaw and Fact

Applying law to facts requires determining law and finding facts.
Only then can law be applied to facts to decide cases correctly.
Determining applicable rules and finding material facts are
interdependent inquiries: until one knows which rules are applicable,
one cannot know which facts are material. Until one knows the facts,
one cannot know which rules are applicable. Settle the applicable rules
too soon, and facts may be overlooked which would change results were
other rules applied. Fail to settle the applicable rules soon enough and
the process may detour to find facts that are not material under the rules
actually applied. This process of going back and forth was identified in
32. VANDEVELDE, supra note 31, at 19-20, 67-70.
33. A legal rule typically states that whenever a generally described prerequisite (P)
exists, a certain consequence (C) applies. The rule thus takes the form of a syllogism:
whenever the rule's prerequisite (P) is realized in a factual situation (F), then the
consequence (C) applies. This is the major premise. The minor premise is that this
factual situation (F) fulfills the prerequisite (P), that is, F is a case of P. The conclusion
then logically follows that for the factual situation F, consequence C applies.
Schematically:
P -- C
(For P-that is, for every case P-C applies)
F= P
(F is a case of P)
F

--

C

(For F, C applies).

There is nothing mystical about syllogistic reasoning. Justice Antonin Scalia of the
United States Supreme Court and his co-author rhetorician Bryan A. Garner wryly
observe that even though we may have never studied logic, all of us use syllogistic
reasoning. ANTONIN SCAUA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF
PERSUADING JUDGES 41 (2008).
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the first part of the twentieth century, but to this day is only occasionally
noted.34
Directing process to the material points in dispute and bounding
process from going off on unproductive paths are benefits that pleading
can deliver. While essential to efficient process, directing and binding
procedure are necessarily tentative if procedure is to achieve correct
decisions according to law through fair process. It is a truism of lawsuits
that no one can predict with certainty what the process will turn up in the
way of facts and legal issues. An issue that may not have been apparent
at the outset may become central to decision.35
The Final Report of the American College of Trial Lawyers
recognizes that "it is not always possible to understand complex fact
situations in detail at an early stage .

..

It therefore proposes

development of a new summary procedure to deal with issues piecemeal
without triggering an automatic right to discovery or trial.37
D.

Iqbal and the Limits ofPleading

The Iqbal majority opinion holds that under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure plaintiffs need to allege in their complaints facts that
plausibly fulfill the requirements of specific causes of action. Some
critics charge that the Court has restored fact pleading without proper

34. See JESSE FRANKLIN BRUMBAUGH, LEGAL REASONING AND BRIEFING: LOGIC
APPLIED TO THE PREPARATION, TRIAL AND APPEAL OF CASES, WITH ILLUSTRATIVE BRIEFS
AND FORMS 364-367 (1917); THOMAS A. MANUET, PRETRIAL 21 (7th ed. 2008) ("This
process, going back and forth between investigating the facts and researching the law, is
); OSKAR HARTWIEG
ongoing and is how you will develop your 'theory of the case' ....
& H.A. HESSE, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG IM ZIVILPROZEB: EIN STUDIENBUCH OBER METHODE,
RECHTSGEFOHL UND ROUTINE IN GUTACHTEN UND URTEIL 78-79 (1987) (Die Lehre vom
Pendelblick); Dieter Stauder with David Llewellyn, Oskar Hartwieg's Thoughts on the
English Legal System, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: ARTICLES IN
HONOUR OF WILLIAM R. CORNISH 47, 51 (D. Vaver and L. Bently 2004); HERBERT
SCHOPF, DIE WECHSELBEZIEHUNG ZWISCHEN SACHVERHALT uND NORMENORDNUNG BEl
DER RECHTSANWENDUNG (Diss. Erlangen under Reinhold Zippelius, 1971). Arthur T.
von Mehren conceived of this problem in terms of concentration and surprise at trial. See

Arthur T. von Mehren, The Significance for Procedural Practice and Theory of the
Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks, 2 EuROPAISCHES RECHTSDENKENS IN
GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART: FESTSCHRIFT FOR HELMUT COING ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG

361 et seq. (Norbert Horn ed., 1982), relevant parts substantially reproduced in ARTHUR
T. VON MEHREN, & PETER L. MURRAY, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed., 2007).

35. See Ray Worthy Campbell, Getting a Clue: Two Stage Complaint Pleadingas a
Solution to the Conley-Iqbal Dilemma, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1191 (2010).
36. ACTL REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
37. Id. One of the principal points relied upon to challenge fact pleading by
advocates of the Federal Rules was that one could not distinguish between law and fact.
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procedures of amendment of the Rules.
Others in this Symposium
address that issue.
Many scholars have criticized the Iqbal decision and its predecessor
Twombly. Some complain that these decisions deny litigants access to
Some believe that the Court's concern with
liberal discovery.40
burdensome discovery is misplaced. Others believe that it prematurely
cuts off litigation. They draw parallels to a trilogy of summary judgment
decisions from the 1980s (known as the Celotex Trilogy)4 1 which eased
standards for summary judgment. Many feared that these decisions
permit courts to decide cases too soon and thereby deny parties their
right to jury trial. The parallel is well taken. Common to both is the idea
that courts are deciding cases before they are ready for decision on their
merits.
Iqbal, Twombly, and the Celotex trilogy are attempts to reconcile
needs for accuracy and fairness on the one hand, with needs for efficient
and free access on the other. Accuracy and fairness demand that courts
consider all material issues in dispute between parties; efficient and free
access require that the costs of proceedings be proportionate to the matter
in controversy.
There is no reason to believe that today's attempts to overcome the
problem of the interdependency of law and fact will succeed where past
attempts have failed.
IV. THREE AMERICAN SYSTEM FAILURES
All expected too much of lawyers and too little ofjudges; all relied
on courts to decide issues and left lawyers to apply law.
Although the three American systems of civil procedure have had
different forms of pleading, all have given lawyers the lead roles in
applying law. Lawyers choose which law applies and determine which
elements are required for application. They decide whether facts that
fulfill those elements are present. Only when lawyers cannot agree on
law, fact or application of law to facts, are they to turn to the court. They

38. Some critics charge that the Court has restored fact pleading without proper
procedures of amendment of the Rules. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, PlausibilityPleading
Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849,
883-886 (2010).
39. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 35, at 1191.
40. See Edward A. Hartnett, The ChangingShape ofFederal Civil PretrialPractice:
Taming Twombly, even after Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 474 (20 10).
41. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986).
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are to present to the court a single issue (in common law pleading) or
multiple issues (in fact and notice pleading) for the court to decide.
Courts consider only the legal claims that the parties present.4 2 In
common law pleading they could not consider other legal claims; they
were bound by the cause of action chosen. In fact pleading and notice
pleading, courts cannot easily raise other legal claims. They are
supposed to be passive. It is up to the lawyers to identify and dispute
issues that arise in applying law to facts. Courts need not concern
themselves with whether all elements of a claim are proven so long as
the unproven elements are not disputed. If a needed element is disputed
and is not shown, they may dismiss the case as unproven without alerting
the party.
The three American systems of civil procedure have varied when
they have required this issue definition to take place. In common law
pleading, it was the goal of the pleading itself. In fact pleading under the
codes, issue definition was intended to be subsequent to pleading and
before trial, 43 but many judges pushed parties to force issue definition in
pleading.4 4 In notice pleading as contemplated when originally adopted
in 1938 in the Federal Rules, issue definition was to occur in the pretrial
phase.45
A.

Common Law Pleading

Common law pleading required that parties agree to put a single
point in issue, of law or of fact, to determine their controversy. The basis
of their agreement was the "form of action." The plaintiff had the choice
of the form of action. That choice forever determined the subsequent
course of the lawsuit. It determined the law that governed the dispute.
That law was contained in the form, which set forth the facts that
plaintiff had to allege and prove. The form of action further determined
the procedures that the court would follow in deciding the case and the
Defendant could respond
remedy that the court could award.
substantively in three basic ways: accept the factual assertions and
contest one point where the assertions did not fulfill a specific legal
requirement, accept the law asserted and contest the truth of one fact
material to application of that law, or accept the law and the truth of the
42. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168-69 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (upholding partial birth abortion ban although noting validity under
commerce clause not raised).
43. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE
193 (2nd ed. 1994).
44. Cf Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of PleadingPractice, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1749, 1753 (1998).
45. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).
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facts, but assert a new ground why the court should not find defendant
liable ("confession and avoidance"). No matter which course the parties
chose, in classic common law pleading they could present only one issue
to the court for decision.
Common law pleading made proceedings efficient. There was only
one issue. If it was an issue of law, no trial was needed. If it was an
issue of fact, trial was a limited affair. The jury did not have to apply
law to fact. That was predetermined by the form the plaintiff chose.
Thus common law pleading made jury trial possible.46
While common law pleading may have been efficient in producing
results, it was deficient in deciding cases accurately and justly on the
merits. It could not well determine law, find facts or apply law to facts.
The substantive law of the forms of action was hopelessly out-of-date.
Long before common law pleading was introduced to America, the
development of forms of action was ended. There was a limited and
unchanging selection. Those that presented themselves in the United
States at the end of the eighteenth century were not suitable for the vast
commercial developments of the nineteenth. The inadequacy of law led
to inadequacy of fact finding. Parties had to fit contemporary facts into
obsolete forms. They did this by making fictitious assertions. To do
justice between the parties, and to preserve business for themselves, the
courts allowed use of fictions.
Even had there been a wider choice of forms to select from,
common law pleading could not deal adequately with applying law to
fact and the problem of the interdependency of law and fact. By forcing
the parties to make one point determinative at an early stage, common
law pleading condemned cases not to be decided on the merits, but to be
determined on a point that might not be material to their claims of right.
The plaintiff might choose one form of action thinking that it was
suitable for his or her legal claim, only to discover facts that precluded
that claim. Although those facts might support another claim, it was too
late. The parties had already defined the issue that would determine the
decision.
Attempts were made to ameliorate the harshest effects of common
law pleading. In some cases defendants were allowed to plead what was
known as "the general issue." In these cases, they were not required to
make one point determinative, but could require the plaintiff to prove all
elements of his or her case. This approach, however, magnified
problems that could already appear where the factual issue was
complicated and created new ones in jury instruction. Where the fact to
46. James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods
and the Rule ofLaw, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 517, 559 (2006).

2010]

PLEADING AND ACCESS TO CIVIL PROCEDURE

1273

be proved was not clear, parties might present evidence at trial of matters
not foreshadowed by the pleadings, which the other party would not be
prepared to meet. What variance between pleading and proof at trial
should a party be permitted? And if a party is permitted to plead the
general issue, which facts must the jury then find?
By 1847 the inadequacy of common law pleading was plain. Fifty
lawyers in New York City led by David Dudley Field appealed to the
New York State Legislature "that a radical reform of legal procedure in
all its departments is demanded by the interests of justice and by the
voice of the people."47 According to a less charitable critic, common law
pleading had become "the fruitful mother of the rankest injustice."
B.

FactPleading(Also Known as Code Pleading)

In 1848 the New York legislature adopted what came to be known
as the Field Code of Civil Procedure. The new code abolished the forms
of action and "[a]ll the forms of pleading heretofore existing." It
provided that henceforth there would be "but one form of action, for the
enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress or prevention
of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action." 49 it
required that the complaint contain "[a] statement of facts constituting
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition,
and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to
know what is intended."5 0 Hence pleading under the code came to be
known as fact pleading as well as code pleading. For the defendant's
response, the Field Code created the "answer." It required that the
answer contain "[i]n respect to each allegation of the complaint
controverted by the defendant, a specific denial thereof, or of any
knowledge thereof sufficient to form a belief'"5 as well as "any new
matter constituting a defence," which defense it required to be stated in
language such as required of the complaint. 52 The Field Code expressly

47. Memorial of the Members of the Bar in the City of New-York, Relative to Legal
Reform 1, Doc. No. 48, 2 N.Y. ASSEMBLY Doc. (Feb. 9, 1847), reprintedin 1 SPEECHES,
ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 261 (1884).
48. Robert William Wells, Observations on the Pleadingsand Practiceof the Courts
of Justice of Missouri: and, A Radical Change Therein Recommended, in A LETTER
ADDRESSED TO THE "METROPOLITAN" (1847), substantially reprinted in Law Reform, 21
U.S. MAG. & DEM. REV. 477, 482, 486 (1847).
49. An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the
Courts of this State, Act of Apr. 12, 1848, ch. 379, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497 [hereinafter NEW
YORK CODE], at § 62, page 510.
50. NEWYORK CODE at § 120(2).
51. NEWYORK CODE at § 128(1).

52.

NEWYORK CODE at § 128(2).
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allowed the defendant to "set forth in his answer, as many grounds of
defense as he shall have."s3
In outward form, Field's code eliminated the danger of premature
choice. No longer did plaintiffs have to choose a specific form of action.
No longer did defendants have to pick one defense. Yet Field's code was
no panacea. It produced problems of its own that are familiar to us to
this day. It left determination of the issues in the hands of the lawyers; it
made no satisfactory provision for their narrowing. According to the
United States Supreme Court, in a case where there were a dozen causes
of action, code pleading worked to "destroy the certainty and simplicity
of all pleadings and introduce on the record an endless wrangle in
writing, perplexing to the court, delaying and impeding the
administration of justice."54 Proliferation of issues not only multiplied
the number of issues that courts had to address but presented many
opportunities for surprises at trial, when litigants raised facts that their
adversaries had not anticipated or created legal issues that they had not
expected.
To reach a manageable number of issues, Field placed hope in truth
and party goodwill. Common law pleading had compelled parties to rely
on fictions and fictitious claims and in effect encouraged them to make
To
untrue averments. Field's code demanded the actual facts.
discourage unfounded claims and defenses, the parties were to verify on
oath the truth of their allegations. 56 According to the New York
Commissioners, the parties would be "better acquainted beforehand with
the really disputable points, and therefore more able to prepare for and
point out to the Court and the jury those which are, and those which are
not, disputed."57
Code reformers did not rely on party goodwill alone. Advocates of
code pleading, foremost among them Field himself, were also advocates
of codification of substantive law. Had they been successful in codifying
53.

NEWYORK CODE at § 129.

54.
55.

McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1858).
E.g., NEW YORK CODE § 65, at 511 (abolishing "feigned issues"); id. § 91, at

515, (requiring that actions be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest).
56. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED To REVISE AND REFORM THE
PROCEEDINGS INTHE COURT OF JUSTICE INTHIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), reprintedin 2 A
MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF His PROFESSIONAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 160 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879); NEW YORK CODE

§ 133, at 523.
57. FIRST REPORT OF THE PRACTICE COMMISSION (Feb. 29, 1848), extensively
excerpted in I SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD 262, 274 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884); see Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a

Description ofa Country's Civil Procedure,7 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 146 (1999)
("Field believed that the verification of pleadings would lead to agreement on the truth of
facts ....
).
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substantive law, the number of possible causes of action would have
been circumscribed and their content better defined. But Field's other
codes failed of adoption. The proposed Civil Code three times passed
the State Assembly only to be vetoed by the Governor twice and to fail in
the Senate once. In the absence of codification, pleading remained
difficult.
Lacking causes of action limited and defined in codes of substantive
law, code pleading failed to bring litigation down to disputing a few
precise points. Courts and lawyers responded in different ways, but both
sought simplification of the case. Both of their approaches, however,
worked against accurate decisions according to law.
Courts sought to engraft on code pleading the old forms of action.
That fit their mindset well. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]he
distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs,
requiring different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely
inseparable from the correct administration of justice in common law
courts." 59 For their grafting they could rely on the requirement that the
complaint include a "statement of facts constituting the cause of
action."6 o What constituted a cause of action became the focus of many
legal battles at the turn of the twentieth century.
Causes of action in
complaints were scrutinized for sufficiency; variances in proof at trial
were grounds for overturning verdicts.6 2 In effect, courts required
lawyers to plead not just the facts of their dispute, but their legal
consequences. In this view, Frederick William Maitland's famous
statement of English law rings true of American as well: "The forms of
action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves."
Lawyers-when they weren't trying to trip up adversaries for not
stating a cause of action-tried to avoid the problem of syllogistic law
58. Cf G.T. Bispham, Law in America, 1776-1876, 122 N. AM. REv. 154, 185-86
(1876).
Whether the results of this simplification of procedure have been altogether
desirable, may possibly be doubted .

..

. [I]n the method of presenting a case

for decision by mere statement and answer, there is lost that precise and clear
definition of the exact points in dispute which is found when the technical
forms of the pleading of the common law are skillfully and carefully applied
. ...
[I]t is plain that at some stage or other of a judicial proceeding,
immaterial and admitted facts must be eliminated, otherwise the investigation
would become hopelessly prolonged and confused ....
Id.
59.
60.
61.
Charles
62.

McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1857).
NEW YORK CODE § 120(2), at 521.
See Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause ofAction, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 828 (1924);
E. Clark, The Cause ofAction, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 354 (1934)
Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513 (2006).
FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMs OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 1

63.
(A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1971)
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application by turning trials into a contest between two "theories of the
case." This approach basically throws syllogisms to the wind and has
judge or jury choose between two competing narratives.
In the view of some observers, the cure turned out to be as bad as
the disease. 65 By the early twentieth century, at one extreme, code
pleading was little better than common law pleading: parties were
subjected to premature issue narrowing. At the other extreme, the
number of issues was boundless, unknowable, and productive of surprise
at trial. In the middle was the theory of the case, which denied applying
law to facts.
In 1906 Roscoe Pound, not yet Dean of Harvard Law School, gave
law reform a big boost when he addressed the annual meeting of the
The Causes of Popular
American Bar Association about the:
66
That address has
Justice.
of
Administration
Dissatisfaction with the
been much followed and commemorated. In 1913 Thomas W. Shelton,
who for much of his professional life led the fight for what became the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, charged that the courts had become
"the fencing schools of highly-trained pleaders" where justice was
subordinated to technicality."6 7 In 1936, three decades after Pound
presented his address, there was little controversy when the secretary of
the Federal Rules drafting committee presented the committee draft with
the seemingly provocative question: "What is the matter with present
methods of the trial of cases? Every one, I think, will agree that our
methods of procedure have three major faults. First, delay; second,
,68
6
expense; third, uncertainty." By then, the bar knew it was true.6 9
64. See Edward D'Arcy, "Theory of the Case" Wrecker ofLaw, 70 CENT. L.J. 294,
295 (1910).
65. Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987,
990 (2003).
66. Roscoe Pound, The Causes ofPopularDissatisfactionwith the Administrationof
Justice, Speech to the American Bar Association (Aug. 26, 1906), reprintedin 29 ANNu.
The talk has been the subject of numerous follow-up
REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906).
conferences. See, e.g., THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE
FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Centennial Reflections on
Roscoe Pound's The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With The Administration of
Justice, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 849 (2007); Conference Of Chief Justices And Conference Of
State Court Administrators Annual Meeting July 29-August 2, 2006 Indianapolis,
Indiana: The Hundred-Year Run of Roscoe Pound, 82 IND. L.J. 1153 (2007); Symposium
Issue: A Century Later: Answering Roscoe Pound's Call for Change in the
Administration ofJustice, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 489 (2007). See also James R. Maxeiner,
1992: High Time For American Lawyers to Learn From Europe, or Roscoe Pound's
1906 Address Revisited, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1991); Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's
Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513 (2006).
67. Thomas W. Shelton, The Reform of Judicial Procedure, 1 VA. L. REV. 89, 90
(1913).
68. William D. Mitchell, The New FederalRules of Civil Procedure,61 ANNU. REP.
A.B.A. 423, 437 (1936).
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Notice Pleading: The FederalRules of Civil Procedureof 1938

they
The Federal Rules made a major change in pleading:
essentially eliminated a role for it in formulating issues.70 Judge Charles
E. Clark, the principal drafter of the Federal Rules, believed that the
procedure codes had successfully abolished the forms of action and the
separation of law and equity, but had failed in their attempt to substitute
fact pleading for common law issue pleading. 7 The reformers had not
appreciated, he argued, that the difference between law and fact is one of
degree.72 A pleader often could not know his or her legal theory before
the evidence was produced and, if he or she did, would not want to give
the theory away.73 The code concept of cause of action, Clark claimed,
had a "long, inglorious, and destructive career," and had "done more
damage than ever the forms of action could possibly do."74 Clark
He proposed
advocated that one should "expect less" of pleading.
abandoning both issue pleading of the common law and fact pleading of
the codes and advocated adoption of "notice pleading."
As a result, the Federal Rules "massively deemphasize[ ]" the role
of pleadings.76 In a notice pleading system, the pleading tells the other
side the general subject of the controversy and little more; in fact, the
Federal Rules require only "a short and plain statement of the claim."77
The official forms make explicit how little is required. For example, a
complaint for goods sold and delivered is sufficient if it states
"Defendant owes plaintiff

dollars for goods sold and delivered by

plaintiff to defendant between June 1, 1936 and December 1, 1936.",7
Unlike common law pleading, the Federal Rules do not require that
parties choose a legal form of action.79 Unlike code pleading, they do

69. When Professor Rachlinski asks why reform now, one might answer that a
generation of lawyers must first pass from the scene as was the case in the time between
Pound's 1906 address and the Federal Rules' implementation in 1938. For the generation
before Pound, fact pleading was the reform. See Leubsdorf, supra note 3 (noting that the
myth of past reform impedes present reform and sarcastically dating the failure of the
federal Rules to a 1975 revelation).
70. Cf, Marcus,supra note 44, at 1749.
71. Clark, History, supra note 18, at 544.
72. Id. at 533-34.
73. Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 259, 260
(1926).
74. Charles E. Clark, The HandmaidofJustice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 312 (1938).
75. See Clark,History, supra note 18, at 542.
76. Fairman, supra note 65, at 990.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. Form 5.
79. Fairman, supra note 65, at 1001.
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not require that parties plead all the elements of a cause of action.80 The
Federal Rules do not normally require that parties even state the facts
that support the claims they make.8
Just as their code reformer predecessors had, the drafters of the
Federal Rules put a great deal of faith in the power of truth and goodwill.
According to Professor Edson R. Sunderland, drafter of the pretrial
procedures of the Federal Rules, the great weakness of pleading for
developing issues of fact for trial was its "total lack of any machinery for
testing the factual basis for the pleaders' allegations and denials."82
Discovery is a means for the parties, prior to trial, to learn the substance
of each other's cases. The theory is that once both sides know the full
truth, they can either settle the case themselves, or can at least agree on
which issues are material to decision. Should the parties be unwilling to
agree, where there is no reasonable dispute about the facts, the court may
determine those claims upon motion for summary judgment. According
to the Supreme Court, the system "relies on liberal discovery rules and
summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to
dispose of unmeritorious claims."83
While discovery is the most used device to accomplish issue
narrowing, Clark and Sunderland provided other devices for defining
issues some of which were innovations of the time: they regularized
judicial review of complaints, pretrial conferences and summary
judgments. All of these devices anticipate greater activity on the part of
judges, which Sutherland welcomed. He wrote of pretrial conferences
that "there is no reason the court should not itself take a hand in the
investigation, supplementing the proceedings and the discovery which
the parties have obtained, by direct interrogation of counsel or parties in
the presence of each other, with a view to eliminating issues through
admissions or through the withdrawal of allegations or denials, or by
obtaining the consent of the parties to the limitation or simplification of

80. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Bennett v. Schmit,
153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998); Fairman, supra note 65, at 1001 n.95 (citing Strong v.
David, 297 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002)).
81. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Integration of Law and Fact in an
Uncharted ParallelProcedural Universe, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1981, 1988 (2004)
("The common law system almost automatically accomplished the diagnosis: the formal
procedures integrated law and fact."). See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (stating that pleading
requirements for fraud or mistake are higher than mere notice: these claims must be
stated with "particularity"). But see Fairman,supra note 65, at 1064 (questioning, but
then essentially affirming the predominance of notice pleading).
82. Id.
83. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
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proof."84 Yet none of these devices is mandatory. Sunderland, when
asked at a conference why he had not made one such institution
mandatory, replied to laughter, that the courts would do as they wanted
85
in any case.
While Clark and Sunderland provided numerous tools to facilitate
framing issues, including discovery, pretrial conferences, stipulations,
and summary judgment, for seventy years those tools have failed to
work. They have failed to work because they are largely in the hands of
lawyers. What lawyers cannot agree upon, judges are loath to decide, for
fear that they will foreclose parties from proving law or fact that only
later is seen to be determinative.
Should we expect lawyers to agree to simplify cases? In many
instances, simplifying and expediting decisions is not in "the interests of
both lawyers' clients." One party may wish to delay judgment. Even
where both parties seek expedition, lawyer agreement is contrary to the
mentalit6 of American advocacy. Professor John S. Beckerman sees
"conflicts between discovery's cooperative ideal and the rest of
adversarial litigation's aggressively partisan ethic" as a fatal flaw of
discovery. 86 Elliott Wilcox, an accomplished litigator strives through
stipulations to narrow issues for trial, but despairs that it is not routine in
a world where trial lawyers are trained "to think that every issue should
be contested, every witness attacked, and every opponent destroyed."87
There is irony that one tool provided by the drafters to facilitate
determining issues and facilitating trials, namely discovery, has been
used, through lawyer control, to extend cases well beyond finding facts
to fulfill elements of applicable laws. While many today find those
wider uses valuable, and even characteristic of American law, there is no
indication that the drafters of the Federal Rules anticipated such uses or
the runaway discovery that we know today. Their expectation of
pleading seems to have been that of one contemporary commentator who
84. Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36
MICH. L. REv. 215, 218-219 (1937). Parallels to the German hearing seem apparent. See
text infra at notes 100-101.
85. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
wrH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES CLEVELAND, OHIO JULY 21, 22, 23,
1938 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938).
86. John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's FatalFlaws, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 505, 585 (2000).
87. Elliott Wilcox, Sfiting the Issues with Stipulations, TRIAL: J. AM. Ass'N FOR
JUSTICE, vol. 44, p. 39 (July 2008) ("Why would two experienced attorneys, who were
hoping for completely opposite outcomes, agree to stipulate to much? Because we know
the strengths and weaknesses of our cases, we were able to identify the true issues that we
needed to focus on. In short, we knew what mattered and, more important, what didn't
matter.").
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thought that that counsel would make a "conscious effort to frame ...
allegations in accordance with a sound theory of recovery, based upon
the facts which he expects later to establish .

. .

. [T]he complaint will

give evidence of being grounded upon legal principles capable of
supporting some form of judicial remedy or redress."88 That same
commentator anticipated the Iqbal decision:
Recovery in the end must rest upon some sound theory; judges are
only displaying good common sense when they look for it at the
outset; nor, in the stress of present-day crowded dockets, can they be
blamed for lack of sympathy for a point of view which would label as
good legal form a manner of pleading calculated to postpone the
determination of fundamental issues until a mass of evidence,
adduced without reference to any previously indicated theory, has
been pitchforked into the judicial arena.89
Iqbal demonstrates the problem, but does not, as other contributors
show, provide answers. The German system suggests solutions.
V.

ONE CIVIL LAW SUCCESS STORY: PARTY-COURT COOPERATION

Pleadingprepares the way to a day in court and leads to decision
accordingto law.90
While for two centuries the United States has fretted over three
major and many minor approaches to pleading and has flitted wildly
from one to another, Germany has stuck with one approach nationally for
130 years. Here we can only outline it in general terms in its specific
role. In the forthcoming book we place it in the context of the overall
process.
In Germany pleadings help direct proceedings to decisions on the
merits. In Germany pleadings help bound proceedings from going off
into the immaterial. The key word is help. Pleadings are part of the
overall process of applying law to fact. They begin that process; but they
do not end it. They do not choose law; they do not define issues.
What pleadings do is prepare the way for the first hearing, the day
in court that every German litigant receives. At that first hearing, what
88. 1 PALMER D. EDMUNDS, FEDERAL RULES OFCIVIL PROCEDURE 61 (1938).
89. Id.
90. A comprehensive and current English language introduction to current civil
procedure by experts in American and German civil procedure is PETER MURRAY & ROLF
STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE (2004). The leading German language works are LEO
ROSENBERG, KARL-HEINZ SCHWAB & PETER GOTrWALD, ZiVILPROZESSRECHT (16th ed.,
2004) (17th ed., 2010) and HEINZ THOMAS, HANS PUTZO, KLAUS REICHOLD & RAINER
Matters not
HOBTEGE, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (27th ed., 2005) (30th ed., 2009).
otherwise cited can be found in these three sources.
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court and parties do together is to begin to identify the material issues in
dispute. In the proceedings that follow, all parties are given an
opportunity to take positions and present evidence on all material
elements in dispute identified at that first hearing or in any subsequent
proceedings. While the court makes some tentative decisions of disputed
material issues, it makes no final decisions of material issues in dispute
until the last oral hearing.
A.

CooperativeLaw Applying

To understand the place of pleadings in German procedure well, it is
helpful to understand the respective roles of parties and judges in
German civil procedure. Contrary to a misconception widely held in the
United States, German civil proceedings are not inquisitorial.9 '
The principle that governs German civil procedure is the ancient
Roman law maxim: da mihifactum, dabo tibijus. In English, the judge
says, give me the facts and I will give you your right. German judges are
not allowed to go out looking for facts. They may only measure against
the law those facts that parties present. They are not inquisitors; they are
facilitators.
Parties must present facts. German judges do know the law against
which they measure facts that the parties present. In the cooperative
world of German civil procedure, German judges tell the parties which
are the facts that parties must present if they are to prevail in their claims
of right. That German judges tell the parties what the criteria for
judgment are does not turn them into inquisitors. They are every bit as
much neutral judges as are their American counterparts.
German civil procedure is cooperative. Cooperation is part of the
right to be heard. A "golden rule" of German procedure forbids surprise
decisions.92 The Code of Civil Procedure imposes on judges a duty to
elucidate the issues in the case. That rule requires that the court call to
the parties' attention any legal rule that it intends to apply. It prohibits
91. In a special section of the forthcoming book, "Day in Court or Inquisition," I
argue that it is American discovery that is inquisitorial.
Grundregein der Relationstechnik, available at
92. Helmut Riifmann,
Similarly a
http://ruessmann.jura.uni-sb.de/zpo2004/Voresung/relationstechnik.htm.
guiding principle of modem American procedure is: no surprises at trial, no surprise
witness and no surprise testimony. David A. Sklansky and Stephen C. Yeazell,
Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal
Procedure,and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L. J. 683, 713 (2006). Surprises undercut the right
to a fair hearing. How the two systems go about preventing surprises helps understand
differences between them. The American rule is directed to lawyers and to surprise at
trial. Parties have panoramic discovery so that they may know all that there is to know
about the case. If they fail to take advantage of this opportunity, they have only
themselves to blame for resulting surprises.
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the court from deciding any material and disputed issue without first
giving each side an opportunity to address that issue. If the judge fails to
elucidate the application of laws to fact fully, the surprised party has
ground for appeal. The duty is vigorously enforced by appellate courts.
The most material language of the rule is quoted in English translation in
the margin.93
The Code of Civil Procedure imposes on parties a duty of
clarification that complements the judges' duty of elucidation. 9 4 It
requires parties to give declarations concerning facts completely and
truthfully. The code provides that an asserted fact is to be treated as
admitted if the other party is silent and fails to contest it. It allows only
limited circumstances in which a mere denial or a claim of lack of
knowledge serves to put a matter in dispute. In most cases parties must
explicitly contest the fact asserted, and if the fact asserted is known or
could be known to the party, then the party must substantiate its contrary
contention with facts known to it. Thus, if in the course of the hearing or
already in pleadings, one party admits a fact asserted by the other, there
is no need to prove the fact. In relatively short order, the judge can
inform the parties of the applicable legal rules and get their agreement on
which matters of fact are material to those rules that are in dispute. 95
Americans are fond of sports analogies in discussing civil
procedure. United States Chief Justice John Roberts in his confirmation
hearings likened judges to baseball umpires. He said that it is the judge's

Zivilprocessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 139, translated in
supra note 90, at 167-68:
(1) The court is to discuss with the parties the relevant facts and issues in
dispute from a factual and legal perspective to the extent reasonable and to
raise questions. It is to cause the parties timely and completely to declare their
positions concerning all material facts, especially to supplement insufficient
references to the relevant facts, to designate the means of proof, and to set forth
claims based on the facts asserted.
(2) The court may base its decision on a claim, other than a minor or auxiliary
claim, on a point of fact or law which a party has apparently overlooked or
considered insignificant only if the court has called the parties' attention to the
point and given opportunity for comment on it. The same provision applies if
the court's understanding of a point of fact or law differs from the
understanding of both parties.
(paragraphs 3 to 5 are omitted). For a book-length academic treatment of the duty
imposed on judges, see ROLF STORNER, DIE RICHTERLICHE AUFKLARUNGSPFLICHT IM
ZIVILPROZESS (1982).
94. For a book-length academic analysis of the parties' duties, see ROLF STORNER,
DIE AUFKLARUNGSPFLICHT DER PARTEIEN DES ZIVILPROZESSES (1976).
95. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges, supra note 27, at 479-80; Zivilprocessordnung
93.

MURRAY & STORNER,

[ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure],

§

138.
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job "to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat." 9 6 Baseball is
practically unknown in Germany, but there is a sports analogy that
Germans might accept. It is not the analogy of the baseball umpire, but
of the track & field referee. Referees do not run or jump, but they do
direct participants more than do baseball umpires. High jump referees
check contestants in for the competition, change the order or location of
events, direct contestants where to practice, tell them what they must do,
show them where they are to begin their jumps, signal when they may
begin, measure how high they have jumped, consider all available
evidence available to reach a fair determination that contestants havewithin the rules-cleared the bar, check all final measurements, measure
and raise the crossbar, inform contestants when they have failed to
correctly clear the high bar set, and determine whether they should have
another chance to clear the bar. 9 7
B.

PleadingsPreparethe Way for a Day in Court

A German complaint is a map for resolution of a dispute, but it is
not an itinerary. It facilitates travel without constraining it. Only at its
outer edges does it set boundaries. This sets it apart from the complaint
of classic American common law pleading, which allowed only one
destination and only one route to it.
In Germany, as in the United States, a lawsuit is commenced with
the service of the complaint on the defendant. In Germany, the
complaint is often the most important document before the court. 98
Reflecting that importance, a German lawyer's fee for a case consists of
two principal halves: preparation of the case-drawing the complaintand representation of the client in the hearings that follow.
The complaint sets out the factual basis of the claim, i.e., the
concrete set of facts or life events from which the plaintiff claims right to
a legal remedy. The complaint may, but need not, state the legal rule on
which the right is based. The court knows the law and is expected to
consider all legal rules possibly applicable to the facts presented by the
plaintiff. The Roman law maxim-give me the facts, I will give you
your right (da mihifactum, dabo tibijus--prevails.
96. John Roberts, Opening statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-09-12-roberts-fulltext-x.htm (Sept. 12,
2005) (transcribed by CQ Transcriptions: USA TODAY Posted 9/12/2005 4:31 PM).
97. See USA TRACK & FIELD, 2009 COMPETITION RULES, Rules 125-127, 142, 148,
180-182.
98. FRANZ-JOSEF RINSCHE, PROZEBTAKTIK: SACHEGERECHTE VERFAHRENSFOHRUNG
For a book-length practitioner's treatment of the
DES RECHTSANWALTS 36 (1987).
complaint, see EGON SCHNEIDER, DIE KLAGE IM ZIVILPROZESS: TAKTIK, PRAXIS, MUSTER

414-17 (2000).
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In Germany, the complaint must be "substantiated." That means
that it must state the facts on which it rests as well as identify the
evidence to be used to establish those facts. The complaint must state
facts so exactly that, based on the information provided, the court could
determine that the legal relief sought should be granted, if the allegations
are true. The degree of substantiation required for each fact alleged
varies. When a fact is not seriously disputed, it can be stated in general
terms. When it is disputed, it should be substantiated precisely.
Proffering too little support in the initial complaint is ordinarily not fatal,
but good practice is to err by substantiating too much rather than too
little. In Iqbal terms, that is plausibility plus, but with an important
difference: the plaintiff establishes plausibility.
If the plaintiff has more than one possible legal claim, the complaint
should state facts that satisfy all the requisite elements of each claim.
Facts that do not support one of the elements of a possible claim have no
place in a complaint.
C

PleadingsBound Proceedings

In Germany pleadings bound proceedings; the complaint determines
the matter in controversy. The matter in controversy is a central concept
of German civil procedure. The matter in controversy determines not
only the definiteness of the complaint, but also subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, joinder of claims and of parties,
amendments of the complaint, and effect of the lawsuit for pending and
future lawsuits. The matter in controversy is defined in life terms; it is
the constellation of facts that are to be judged in the case. It is not based
on legal characterizations of those facts. Judging the facts is the job of
the judge.
In Germany, while the complaint contributes to bounding
proceedings, it is not the first line of defense against frivolous lawsuits. 99
The fee system is: losers pay. How much they pay is determined by
how much of the amount in controversy winners win. Claim E10,000,
but win only C9,000, and one is entitled to reimbursement of only 90% of
costs and fees and must pay 10% of the loser's costs and fees.
Reimbursable fees are set by schedules that are pegged to the amount in
controversy. The fee system discourages making frivolous claims or
inflating sound ones. To lower process risks, "claim splitting," that is,
suing only for part of the claim, e.g., only one of six missed monthly
payments, is common.

99.

Compare Marcus, supra note 44, at 1756.
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In Germany, the complaint likewise is not the first line of defense
against burdensome discovery. Judicial supervision of evidence taking
is. Parties do not have license to take evidence on their own. They must
request that the court take evidence. While judges are obligated to be
generous in allowing the taking of evidence, they are vigilant in
restricting the taking of evidence to material matters in dispute between
the parties. Often taking of evidence is not necessary: the pleadings and
subsequent admissions by parties permit decision without oral testimony.
In Germany, judges do not have to engage in the kind of personal
judgment of complaints that American scholars rightly fear of
"plausibility" reviews here. In Germany, judges determine whether a
complaint states allegations that fulfill the statutory elements of the law.
Whether those allegations are plausible depends not on the imagination
and preconception of judges, but whether the plaintiff is able to
substantiate its claims with potential evidence that, if true, would prove
the fact claimed.
In Germany, the complaint is the first line of defense against judges
who would range beyond the affairs the parties put to them for decision.
The matter in controversy strictly limits the subject matter of the
proceedings. The court has no authority to go beyond the matter in
controversy, except as parties may appropriately raise additional claims.
Were a judge to go off in a direction not within the matter in controversy,
the affected party could complain. German judges, however, rarely are
tempted to such diversions. Diversions can only cause them trouble.
Affected parties can object and appeal to higher courts. German judges
are professionals. Were they to divert proceedings to matters not
Their
germane to the dispute, their reputations would suffer.
workloads-already substantial-would increase.
D.

From Pleadingsto Proceedings:Reviewing Complaints

In Germany, the court-not the plaintiff-serves the complaint.
Before the court serves the complaint, the judge reviews the complaint
The
for procedural prerequisites and for substantive soundness.
substantive review corresponds to a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
while the procedural review corresponds to the procedural defenses of a
Rule 12(b) motion. The big difference from American practice is that a
judge conducts the review in every case and before the court serves the
complaint.
If the judge finds that a complaint is deficient, on either procedural
or substantive grounds, the judge is not to dismiss the complaint
immediately, but is to call the deficiency to the attention of the plaintiff
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and to request supplementation. If plaintiff fails to cure the deficiency,
the judge may take evidence on the point. If still not satisfied, the judge
dismisses the complaint. If the judge is satisfied with the complaint as
supplemented, the judge has the complaint served. Should the judge
dismiss the complaint, the plaintiff may make application for a higher
court to determine the issue.
Judicial pre-service review does not preclude the defendant, upon
service, from challenging either procedural permissibility or substantive
soundness. If the defendant does raise either challenge, the court may
hold a hearing on the point. But the defendant must raise the issue
immediately upon service.
Dismissal prior to service spares the potential defendant the
headache of a lawsuit altogether. It also saves the plaintiff substantial
legal fees. Not only does plaintiff not have to pay the potential
defendant's legal fee, the plaintiff has incurred only half the usual
plaintiffs fee. Moreover, if the dismissal is the fault of the lawyer, the
lawyer may forego the fee.
E. Preparingfor the (First)Day in Court
Once the court has reviewed the complaint, it begins to plan
proceedings to identify material issues in dispute which once resolved
will permit it to apply law to facts. That is, it sets in motion the
processes of bringing law and fact together to apply law. Essentially
what the court does is to identify the legal rules likely applicable in the
case and to compare them with the factual allegations and, if necessary,
evidence presentations of the parties, to determine whether facts are
present that fulfill all the requirements of one or more rules.' 0 0
Here we are on the borderline between pleadings that initiate
proceedings and proceedings that eventually make possible deciding the
case. We need to discuss just enough of those proceedings to understand
the role of the pleadings.
Coincident with preliminary review of the complaint the judge
determines how the case is to proceed further: whether the case will use
additional written proceedings or will use a so-called early first hearing.
The judge's choice is pragmatic: the judge selects the method that the
judge thinks is more likely in this case to be more efficient, i.e., is more
likely to simplify and hasten framing of the material and disputed issues.
Most German judges prefer early oral hearings in routine, contested
cases. A party dissatisfied with the choice may request that the judge use

100. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 823, 826-30 (1985).
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the other method; in that case, the party must state why the other method
would be more efficient.
The goal of the preliminary hearing-or of written preliminary
proceedings-is to identify the legal rules likely applicable, their
constituent elements, and which facts material to their application are in
dispute. Determination of which rules are applicable is tentative. While
the court directs attention of the parties first to the factual elements of
those rules most likely applicable, the parties are not precluded from
returning to those rules not first considered should it appear later that
they are applicable.
In the preliminary hearing the court calls attention of the parties to
those facts material to possibly applicable rules on which the parties do
not agree. The court asks the party bearing the burden of proof for that
element to present the necessary proof. The court may also alert the
other side that at some point, that if the proposing party presents what it
needs to, the burden of proof may shift to it. No longer will it be
sufficient to challenge the proponent's proof, but it will be necessary to
bring its own affirmative evidence. A classic example is product
liability. Once a plaintiff makes certain showings, then it is up to the
defendant to bring forward evidence that rebuts that showing.
Most features of German civil procedure have their counterparts in
American civil procedure; while those counterparts may have different
foci or function somewhat differently, parallels are nonetheless clearly
recognizable. The German hearing of the parties (Parteianhdrung),on
the other hand, has no counterpart in American civil procedure. A
hearing of the parties is required either in the preliminary hearing or as a
main hearing following the preliminary written procedures. In the
hearing of the parties, the judge discusses the case directly with the
parties and their lawyers. These discussions are not evidentiary. They
do not constitute taking testimony of the parties. The judge clarifies the
contentions of the parties and draws out the material issues in dispute
between them. In short, the judge does what historic common law
pleadings were supposed to do: ascertain the subject for decision.
The court's clarification of the issues in the oral hearing largely
supplants the pleadings as guide to resolution of the dispute. In the oral
hearing the court identifies the possibly applicable legal rules, the
elements of those rules, which elements are not in dispute, and which
elements are contested. The complaint has now fulfilled its guidance
function.
Proceedings remain for the court through further hearings and
through the taking of testimony to find the material, disputed facts and to
test them as found against the applicable rules.
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The interdependent nature of determinations of law and findings of
fact does not present insurmountable obstacles. Limited only by the
matter in controversy itself, the court has little difficulty pivoting from
one issue to another as determined law or found facts may require.
The pleadings have played a major role in facilitating the first day in
court and leading the court toward a determination of the dispute
according to law.
The efficacy of the pleadings is one reason that the German
Minister of Justice boldly asserts of law made in Germany:
The law is predictable, affordable and enforceable. Our legislation
balances the various interests in a fair and equitable manner, ensuring
just solutions. Everyone has access to justice, independent of their
financial means. What's more, thanks to the efficient administration
of justice, German courts decide without delay and German court
orders will be enforced swiftly. After all, there is no use in having
well-considered rules and regulations if the process of applying them

proves too lengthy.

01

VI. CONCLUSIONS

We have seen that for two centuries American pleading has failed to
work. It has failed to work because it has left defining issues to
adversary lawyers. It has failed to work because it has been unable to
overcome the challenge of the interdependent nature of determining law
and finding facts.
From the above examination in conclusion I would like to point to
three lessons:
(1) Pleading can contribute positively to applying law to facts:
Pleading is a part of an overall process of applying law to facts.
That process brings law and facts together. Pleading is not an end in
itself. There should be no pleading practice. Pleading should and can
facilitate applying law to fact, accurately, fairly, expeditiously, and
efficiently.
(2) German pleading and process show how pleading can help
through giving a greater role to judges than American pleading has:

101.

LAW-MADE

IN

GERMANY:

GLOBAL,

EFFEKTIV, KOSTENGlNSTIG

(released

October 2008). The brochure is introduced by the Minister of Justice, Brigitte Zypries. It
states that it is published by Bundesnotarkammer, the Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer, the
Deutscher Anwaltverein, the Deutscher Notarverein and the Deutscher Richterbund. It is
available at www.lawmadeingermany.de. It is in parallel German and English texts.
Admiration for the German system is long-standing. For example, Roscoe Pound, when
criticizing the American system, spoke of the "wonderful mechanism of modem German
judicial administration. . . ." Pound, Causes supra note 66, at 397.
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Give me the facts, I will give you your right, works. Parties
cooperate with the court to determine whether facts fit the law. German
judges are facilitators.
(3) After two centuries it is time to draw on foreign experiences to
develop new ways rather than to remain stuck recasting failed old ways.
In 1851 a Massachusetts reform commission contemplated looking
abroad for solutions but declined to do so. It saw borrowing from a
foreign system of law as something "extremely hazardous and
inconvenient."1 0 2 Better, it thought, "to take what we now have ... and
amend and build upon it, not in a foreign style of architecture or with
wholly new materials, but, as far as possible, with old materials and after
the old fashions . . . .,103 One hundred and fifty-nine years is more than
enough time to try. It's time to look abroad. 10 4 Is it too audacious to
hope that we might follow health care reform with real legal reform?

102. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED To REVISE AND REFORM THE
PROCEEDINGS INTHE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), reprintedin 2 A
MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF His PROFESSIONAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 159 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879)

103. Id.
104. Cf RUDOLPH VON JHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS, Part I, 9th ed. 1955,
translatedin KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
17 (Tony Weir, trans., Oxford University Press 3rd ed. 1998) ("The reception of foreign
legal institutions is not a matter of nationality, but of usefulness and need. No one
bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, but only a
fool would refuse quinine just because it didn't grow in his back garden.").
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